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Collective Bargaining between Decentralization and Stability: 
A Sectoral Model Explaining the Swiss Experience during the 
1990s** 
At the beginning of the 1990s, the abrupt change in economic conditions, character-
ized by a sharp rise of unemployment and the decline of traditional manufacturing  
industries, triggered a wide debate on collective bargaining in Switzerland. Employers'  
associations have actively sought the decentralization of the provisions contained in sec-
toral agreements. Although collective bargaining coverage has decreased only slightly, the 
functioning of Swiss industrial relations has been seriously challenged on various grounds 
during the 1990s. In important economic sectors, bargaining over key issues such as wages 
and working time has been transferred from the sectoral to the company level. Yet the  
general trend of decentralization and deregulation has affected the existing collective 
agreements in a highly uneven way. The in-depth changes in some industries constrast with 
the stability of bargaining in others. The scope of the present article is thus to illuminate 
both the general trend and the striking inter-sectoral differences within this trend. In a first 
step, we present empirical evidence on decentralization of sectoral collective bargaining.  
In a second step, we show nuances within this trend by developing an analytical framework 
that accounts for the pattern of change which collective bargaining has undergone in  
different economic sectors. 
Die Schweizerischen Tarifverhandlungen zwischen Dezentralisierung und Stabilität:  
Entwicklung eines sektoriellen Modelles für die 90er Jahre 
Die brüske konjunkturelle Abkühlung anfangs der 90er Jahre und der mit ihr einhergehende, 
ungewohnt kräftige Anstieg in den Arbeitslosenzahlen löste in der Schweiz eine hitzige Debatte ü-
ber das System der kollektiven Verhandlungen aus. Arbeitgeberverbände forderten lautstark eine 
Flexibilisierung und Dezentralisierung der Branchenabkommen. Obwohl der Deckungsgrad mit 
Gesamtarbeitsverträgen nur wenig abnahm, kam die schweizerische Sozialpartnerschaft unter er-
heblichen Druck während des letzten Jahrzehnts. In wichtigen Industriezweigen wurden kollektive 
Verhandlungen über die Löhne und die Arbeitszeit von der Branchenebene in die Unternehmen ver-
lagert, der Teuerungsausgleich abgebaut und die Jahresarbeitszeit eingeführt. Der generelle Trend 
in Richtung Dezentralisierung und Deregulierung hat sich jedoch sehr unterschiedlich auf die ver-
schiedenen Wirtschaftszweige ausgewirkt. Während in einigen Branchen die Verhandlungslogik 
grundlegend verändert wurde, herrschte in anderen Branchen Stabilität vor. Das Ziel des vorlie-
genden Artikels ist es deshalb, einerseits den allgemeinen Dezentralisierungstrend empirisch zu un-
terlegen und andererseits die erstaunlichen Branchenunterschiede innerhalb desselben Trends 
durch ein strukturelles Modell zu erklären.  
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1. Introduction1 
Despite the celebration of „labour peace” and „social partnership” in Switzer-
land, Swiss industrial relations have largely remained understudied in specialized lit-
erature. The lack of reliable data, the decentralization and complexity of the system as 
well as the relatively good economic performance might explain the weak interest 
(see, however, Aubert 1989; Bauer/Baumann 1992; Prince 1994; Fluder/Hotz-Hart 
1998; Fluder 1998; Mach 2000). In addition, Swiss industrial relations have featured 
a high degree of stability since the 1950s and, unlike in other Western European 
countries, did not undergo major adjustments during the 1970s and 1980s. This 
somewhat changed at the beginning of the 1990s when the GDP shrank for three 
years in a row and unemployment rose from 1 per cent in 1990 to almost 5 per cent in 
1994. In the context of a morose economy, employers’ associations actively asked for 
less regulation and more company autonomy in wage-setting. Although collective 
bargaining coverage decreased only slightly, the functioning of Swiss industrial rela-
tions has been seriously challenged in various respects. In a series of industrial sec-
tors, collective bargaining over key issues such as wage and working time was trans-
ferred from the sectoral to the company level. Moreover, the widespread wage-index 
clauses disappeared from most collective agreements, wages increases on an individ-
ual basis were introduced into collective agreements and norms concerning working 
time rendered more flexible. 
Yet, deregulation has affected collective bargaining in Switzerland in a highly 
uneven way. The experience of brisk decentralization in some industries contrasts 
with the notable stability in others. During the crisis of the 1990s, the traditionally 
marked differences in collective bargaining across economic sectors have not only 
persisted but have even been amplified. The scope of our contribution is hence two-
fold. In a first step, we present some empirical evidence of the decentralization trend 
in Swiss collective bargaining during the last decade. In a second step, we nuance this 
general trend by developing a model that tries to account for the observed differences 
between economic sectors. However, before turning our attention to the trends of de-
centralization and deregulation, we briefly depict the marked changes in the eco-
nomic context of the 1990s and their impact on union membership and on employers’ 
strategies in collective bargaining. 
2.  Structural changes in the labour market and their impact on Swiss unions 
Unlike most other West European countries, Switzerland passed the decade after 
the oil shock practically unharmed by mass unemployment, gaining thereby fame for 
its unusually good labour market performance. This changed at the beginning of the 
1990s when the economic boom came to an end and the Swiss economy entered a re-
                                                          
1  We would like to thank Roland Erne and Alex Fischer for their helpful comments on an ear-
lier version of the article. 
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cession of exceptional length. As a consequence of very high interest rates (1989-92) 
and a brisk exchange rate appreciation (1994-96), growth rates stagnated for six years 
in a row (Ettlin and Gaillard 2001). Table 1 shows that during this period unemploy-
ment rates rose from below 1 per cent in 1990 to over 5 per cent in 1997. So, contrary 
to the 1970s when the recession had hit Switzerland harder but did not affect (offi-
cial) unemployment statistics, the economic crisis of the 1990s brought along unem-
ployment rates that the country had not known since the 1930s. 
Tab. 1:  Economic growth, civilian employment and unemployment during the 1990s   
(Source: Swiss National Bank, Bulletin mensuel des statistiques économiques; OECD 
(2000): Labour force statistics, Paris) 
 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Real GDP 
growth in % 3,7 -0,8 -0,1 -0,5 0,5 0,5 0,3 1,7 2,4 1,6 3,0 
Civilian  
employment in 
1.000* 
3.821 3.891 3.831 3.802 3.789 3.800 3.813 3.802 3.848 3.873 3.915
Unemployment 
rate  
in % 
0,5 1,1 2,5 4,5 4,7 4,2 4,7 5,2 3,9 2,7 2,0 
* Corresponds to civilian employment minus the unemployed 
 
The change in the functioning of the labour market, as reflected by the sudden 
emergence of a substantial unemployment problem, is mainly explained by a de-
crease in the flexibility of labour supply. Whereas during the recession of the 1970s, 
more than 250.000 foreign workers had left Switzerland and many Swiss women had 
retreated from the labour market into economic inactivity, these two groups were not 
cushioning the cyclical downswing any longer during the 1990s for two reasons. For 
one thing, a large part of the foreign workforce had come into possession of a perma-
nent residence permit at the beginning of the 1990s. Furthermore, Switzerland intro-
duced in 1982 a compulsory unemployment insurance which – unlike in 1975/76 
when only 20 per cent of the entire workforce was covered by an unemployment 
scheme – allowed laid-off workers both to remain in the labour market and to appear 
in official unemployment statistics (Flückiger 1998; Schmidt 1995). 
Hand-in-hand with the recession and the rise in unemployment went the struc-
tural change of the Swiss labour market. Besides the employers’ offensive, in particu-
lar two structural trends affected the equilibrium in industrial relations: tertiarization 
and feminization. During the 1990s, the employment losses were heavily felt in both 
manufacturing and construction. At the same time, the service sector continued to ex-
pand. In terms of employment shares, the industrial sector shrank thus from 32 per 
cent in 1990 to 26 per cent in 2000, whereas the tertiary sector passed from 63 to 69 
per cent (OECD 2000 and 2001). Tertiarization was accompanied by an increase in 
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the number of women gainfully employed, growing despite the rise in unemployment 
while men’s participation rate sank by 3 per cent. Women’s mounting participation 
rates went along with an expansion of (heavily female) part-time employment, pass-
ing from 25.4 to 29.3 per cent between 1991 and 2000 (BFS 2001).  
As a consequence of these structural changes, the core category of industrial 
capitalism – male manufacturing workers – has become a minority in the Swiss la-
bour market. Between 1990 and 1999, the share of men engaged in the industries had 
dwindled from 27 to a mere 20 per cent of the entire labour force. At the same time, 
the share of women working in the services expanded from 29 to 35 per cent, ac-
counting thus for more than a third of total Swiss employment (OECD 2000). 
Not surprisingly, these trends have given a serious blow to Switzerland’s organ-
ized labour movement by stripping it of a substantial part of its members. Divided 
along confessional (the catholic CNG as opposed to the social-democratic SGB) and 
manual/non-manual lines (the workers’ unions CNG and SGB as opposed to a series 
of employees’ associations), the Swiss system of unions is rather fragmented.2 This 
fragmentation explains why the largest umbrella federation of the country, the SGB 
(accounting by itself for only 50 per cent of total unionization), has traditionally fo-
cused on blue-collar workers employed in industry. As it traditionally neglected 
white-collar segments and occupations dominated by women, only 9 per cent of SGB 
members worked in 1997 in the private service sector as opposed to the 55 per cent 
employed in industry (Bauer/Ackermann 1998). Similarly, the SGB’s share of female 
members amounted to a mere 20 per cent in 1999 (Bauer and Füglister 2000).3 
Hence, it comes as no surprise that the changes in the employment structure have led 
to a substantial erosion in union membership in general and SGB membership in par-
ticular (see table 2). In fact, almost all confederations lost substantial ground in terms 
of membership during the 1990s.4 
Quite expectedly, the loss in membership is reflected in a lower degree of un-
ionization. Between 1990 and 1999, it fell from 27 per cent to 24.3 per cent and 
moved Switzerland nearer to the bottom end in the Western European ranking 
(Ebbinghaus/Visser 1999). The union movement responded to declining membership 
by concentrating its forces. During the 1990s, the unions – in particular the member 
                                                          
2  Besides its fragmentation, the Swiss union system is characterized by a low degree of vertical 
integration of the affiliated unions into the umbrella confederations. The most important func-
tion of confederations is the representation of interests at the political level. Besides political 
lobbying, there is only very little co-ordination of affiliated unions’ bargaining which is 
mainly done at the sectoral level. 
3  In the two largest and most powerful member unions of the SGB, GBI and SMUV, the share 
of women lay even lower in 1999, amounting to 6 and 16 per cent respectively. 
4  Two notable exceptions are the non-affiliated federations of nurses and, above all, teachers 
which continued to grow during the 1990s. 
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unions of SGB and CNG – reformed their structure through a series of mergers and 
the creation of new coalitions. 
Tab. 2:  Evolution of membership in the four major union confederations  
(Source: Ackermann, various years; Bauer/Füglister 2000) 
 SGB FÖV* VSA CNG Others Total 
 Schweizeri-
scher Ge-
werkschafts-
bund 
Föderativ-
verband des 
Personals  
öffentl. Ver-
waltungen  
Vereinigung 
Schweizer 
Angestell-
tenverbände 
Christlich-
nationaler 
Gewerk-
schaftsbund 
(teachers, 
policemen, 
nurses etc.) 
 
1980 459.900 160.000 144.700 103.200 146.200 868.000 
1990 443.900 165.900 135.600 116.500 158.500 876.400 
1995 419.800 169.400 127.100 99.200 166.500 832.900 
2000 373.200 151.000 103.000 102.300° 152.000 754.000° 
 * 90 per cent of the members of FÖV are also affiliated to the SGB. They are thus also included 
in SGB membership. But they are not counted twice in the total;   
° data for 1999. 
 
On the employers’ side, collective bargaining remains in the hands of individual 
sectoral federations, part of the peak employers association „Schweizerischer Arbeit-
geberverband” (SAV). Despite the absence of reliable data, the degree of organization 
of Swiss employers, and of business interests in general, is considered as particularly 
high in international comparison (Fluder/Hotz-Hart 1998: 272). Over the recent pe-
riod, employers’ associations did not undergo a decline in membership comparable to 
the trade unions. However, individual companies have increasingly questioned the 
role and the efficiency of employers’ associations. Not surprisingly, various associa-
tions complained the loss of individual member firms. Dissatisfaction with the ser-
vices provided by the associations, changes in the organization of production and the 
necessity to adjust more rapidly to increasing competitive pressures caused individual 
firms to resign from employers’ associations or to ask for more decentralization of 
constraining norms in sectoral collective agreements. Partly as a consequence, some 
reorganization of employers’ associations took place during the last decade in the en-
gineering, textile and clothing industries, in media printing and in the hotel and cater-
ing sector. 
The structural changes of the labour market and the rise in unemployment were 
not only paralled by a restructuring process of employers’ and, above all, workers’ 
organizations. It also had an impact on the number of employees covered by a collec-
tive agreement, decreasing from 1.400.000 to 1.267.000 between 1991 and 1999. But 
as is shown in table 3, the fall in individuals covered was only partially passed on to 
the coverage rate as the number of private sector employees also decreased during the 
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1990s, leading to a small drop in the coverage rate from 47 (1991) to 45 per cent 
(1999).5  
Tab. 3:  Individuals covered by a collective agreement in the private sector   
(Source: BFS, various years) 
 1991 1992 1994 1996 1999 
Individuals covered 1.400.000 1401.600 1.304.300 1.214.300 1.268.600 
Coverage rate in % 47 49 46 43 45 
 
Since the 1950s, Swiss industrial relations have been characterized by their sta-
bility and the peaceful resolution of industrial conflicts. „Labour peace clauses”, 
codified in most collective agreements and thereby both prohibiting unilateral action 
by social partners and establishing arbitrary institutions, largely account for this sta-
bility. Despite a slight increase during the 1990s, industrial disputes remained of little 
importance and did not significantly alter the functioning of collective bargaining 
(Häubli and Weber 2001). Nonetheless, wage negotiations and the renewal of collec-
tive agreements have become tougher and generally last longer than in the previous 
decades. 
While data on the coverage rate and on industrial disputes do not suggest a ma-
jor upheaval, a closer look at industrial relations in major industries and large compa-
nies show that collective bargaining did undergo some rather important changes in a 
series of sectors. It is to these changes that we turn our attention in the following sec-
tion. 
3.  The shift in collective bargaining from the industry to the company level 
During the 1970s and 1980s, Swiss industrial relations had featured a remark-
able degree of stability. Unlike most countries in Western Europe, Switzerland’s sys-
tem of collective bargaining had not been affected by a trend of decentralization and 
deregulation up to the end of the 1980s. This is, on the one hand, explained by the al-
ready high level of decentralization of collective bargaining. Compared to other neo-
                                                          
5  Yet, it must be emphasized that not all individuals covered by a collective agreement benefit 
from collective wage setting. As individual data for 1998 show, only 39 per cent of private-
sector employees have their wages set by collective bargaining, 30 per cent on the sectoral 
level and 9 per cent on the company level. For the remaining 61 per cent wage agreements are 
strictly individual (BFS 2002a: 7). The difference between the coverage rate (1999: 45 per 
cent) and the share of individuals having their wages set by collective bargaining (1998: 39 
per cent) is explained by the fact that in sectors where collective agreements stipulate wage 
bargaining on the company level, not all companies dispose of work councils. Hence, the em-
ployees of these companies are covered by a collective sectoral agreement (concerning vaca-
tion, dismissal provisions etc.) but in lack of a work council, wages are nonetheless negotiated 
individually.  
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corporatist countries, industrial relations in Switzerland have always been fairly de-
centralized, wages being set at either the industry or the company level (Calmfors/ 
Driffill 1988; Fluder/Hotz-Hart 1998). Coordination of collective bargaining across 
economic sectors at the national level is almost unknown. Similarly, macroeconomic 
management through the active coordination of fiscal, monetary and wage policies 
has never been pursued in Switzerland (Traxler 1995: 198). The high degree of de-
centralization is illustrated by the important wage differentials between sectors: In 
2000, the mean wage in the hotel and catering sector or in the textile industry was 
only 51 or 62 per cent respectively of the mean wage in the chemical industry (BFS 
2002b).  
On the other hand, as the decade of the 1980s coincided with a period of sus-
tained growth and very low unemployment, there was little need for Swiss employers 
to challenge the system’s stability. This, however, changed with the abrupt economic 
downswing at the beginning of the 1990s. As mentioned above, mounting interest 
rates, sluggish growth and a sharp rise in unemployment prompted employers to di-
rect their discontent towards a system of collective bargaining that came to be con-
sidered as too rigid and excessively regulated, hampering individual firms’ capacity 
to adjust rapidly to changing demand and ever shorter product-life cycles (Hasler/ 
Cappis 1990). 
As a consequence, the Swiss Federation of Employers (SAV) sparked off a 
heated debate about the state of social partnership in the country. The newly elected 
president of the SAV sharpened the traditionally conciliatory discourse, defining 
himself as „an advocate of a co-ordinated elimination of excessive regulation” 
(speech held in 1993) and making the decentralization of collective bargaining from 
the industry to the company level the priority of his presidency. In the same vein, the 
former head of the Federal Office of Industry and Employment pleaded in the coun-
try’s leading business newspaper for autonomy in wage setting to be situated on the 
firm level (Hug 1993; see also Rieger 1994 on the divergences among employers). 
Further criticism of collective bargaining came two years later from a White book, 
signed by a group of prominent economists and business representatives, demanding 
market oriented reforms for Switzerland’s cartellized domestic sectors of the econ-
omy and more flexibility for companies in decisions about wages and working time 
(De Pury et al. 1995). 
This program was put into practice in different ways by the sectoral employers’ 
associations. For one thing, the number of collective agreements concluded on the 
firm level increased by 11.5 per cent between 1991 and 1996, whereas collective 
agreements signed at the traditionally dominant industry level fell by 2.5 per cent 
over the same period (BFS 1999). Simultaneously, the unions’ right to negotiate over 
wages came under pressure in industries where sectoral agreements persisted. In the 
second half of the 1990s, wage setting was decentralized from the sectoral to the 
company level in five industries: In the chemical and clothing industries (1996), in 
banking (1997), media printing (1999) and, to a lesser extent, watch-making (2001). 
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In these industries, sectoral agreements no longer contain any norms allowing unions 
to negotiate over effective wages above the company level. 
Similarly, collective bargaining over working time was shifted from the eco-
nomic sector to the single company by introducing the notion of annualized time 
schemes into the collective agreements of the chemical (1996), engineering (1998) 
and media printing industry (1999). Some elements of working time flexibility were 
also adopted in the collective agreements of the banking sector and the watch-making 
industry. Unlike the trade-off in the German metal industry, the introduction of flexi-
bility in Switzerland was nowhere accompanied by a reduction in working time – the 
costly mobilization of the Swiss Metal Workers’ Union (SMUV) in 1998 remained 
ineffective, hampered by the favourable attitude of the employees’ association to-
wards more flexibility. However, the trend of decentralization was not limited to sec-
toral agreements. At the beginning of the 1990s, two of the largest employers in the 
Swiss economy, the retail chain Migros and the airline Swissair (gone bankrupt in 
2001) succeeded in decentralizing wage bargaining from the central company level to 
the single plants or regional branches. A prominent example of intra-firm decentrali-
zation dating back to the end of the 1980s was the case of ABB. Following its merger 
with Swedish Asea, Swiss BBC became ABB in 1988 and decided to shift bargaining 
rounds from the level of the holding company to single plants. The substitution of the 
powerful central works council by several local councils, which had to be newly 
formed, simultaneously increased the plants’ autonomy and weakened the metal un-
ion’s position (SMUV) within the multinational. 
The common rationale behind these initiatives was the employers’ aim to reduce 
the influence of unions on wage setting. At the same time, it meant a shift of compe-
tence from the unions operating at the industry level to the works councils active at 
the company or plant level. Yet, compared to Germany or the Scandinavian countries, 
Switzerland’s network of works councils is both thinner, less solid and more frag-
mented through the presence of several competing unions and employees’ associa-
tions. With the exception of the engineering, chemical, and perhaps media printing 
industries, the tradition of worker representation on the company level is actually 
quite low. But even in the engineering industry where wage bargaining at the com-
pany level has taken place since 1937, only about 400 out of the 600 firms covered by 
the sectoral agreement dispose of a works council (Oesch 2001b). This partially ex-
plains why Swiss employers were much less reluctant than their German colleagues 
to decentralize collective bargaining over wages and working time. Thelen (2000) ar-
gues that if the German works councils were to take on more of the bargaining re-
sponsibilities traditionally reserved for the unions, it would be likely to undermine the 
country’s system of constructive relations. The same danger seems smaller in Swit-
zerland. Besides lower unionization and a weaker support for the social-democratic 
party, a series of reasons account for this difference: Firstly, legislative provisions on 
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works councils, although catching up,6 are still considerably less far reaching in Swit-
zerland than in Germany; secondly, one of the dominant sectors of Swiss collective 
bargaining, the engineering industry, claims a long tradition of stable relationships 
and social peace on the company level which, at the same time, weakens the strike 
capacity of unions and thus reduces the risk of disruptive wage disputes at the plant 
level; finally, as highlighted by Soskice (1990: 41), despite the decentralization of in-
dustrial relations in Switzerland, companies continue to draw benefits from co-
ordination through strongly linked employer organizations and networks that helps to 
prevent wage drifts. 
3.1 The deregulation and individualization of wage-setting 
In Swiss industrial relations, yearly wage bargaining traditionally evolved 
around the cost-of-living clauses which since the 1970s had gradually been embodied 
in most collective agreements. Whereas in 1972 only 39 per cent of all agreements 
made reference to inflation as a criteria of wage compensation, in 1991, 67 per cent of 
agreements included such a norm constraining employers to negotiate about an ad-
justment of wages to the cost-of-living. Over the same period, the number of agree-
ments containing a clause of automatic cost-of-living compensation doubled from 8 
to 17 per cent (Hess and Schwab 1992: 37). This automatic adjustment of wages to 
inflation came to be seen by economists and industrialists as a dead-weight at the be-
ginning of the 1990s when the economic boom abruptly ended and gave way to infla-
tion rates of 6.1 per cent (1990) and 5.1 per cent (1991).  
Subsequently, the employers’ associations heavily mobilized against the „infla-
tionary and rigid” measure and succeeded in a short laps of time to have the norm of 
automatic compensation dropped from virtually all collective agreements. Between 
1993 and 1995, the automatism disappeared, despite some unions’ resistance, from 
major sectoral agreements like the ones signed in the chemical industry, in construc-
tion or in media printing. Similarly, the clause was removed from large agreements 
concluded at the company level like the ones of Migros, Coop (Switzerland’s two 
biggest firms in retail trade) or Swissair. In the four years from 1992 until 1996, the 
percentage of workers covered by a collective agreement and benefiting from auto-
matic adjustment of wages fell thus from 20.9 to 0.3 per cent (Wiesendanger Marti-
novits 1993; BFS 1997). Moreover, after the elimination of the automatic wage com-
pensation, employers’ associations successfully pushed in the same industries (chem-
istry, media printing) and in others (textile) to further remove from agreements the 
written reference to inflation as a criteria for wage bargaining. It is significant that af-
ter 1996, the Federal Office for Statistics ceased altogether to collect data about infla-
tion adjustment clauses in collective agreements. Not surprisingly, the decentraliza-
                                                          
6  In 1993, in order to harmonize Swiss law with European legislation, the Parliament adopted a 
new employee participation law, which institutionalizes information and consultation rights 
for workers’ delegations in companies with more than 50 employees. 
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tion of collective bargaining and the deregulation of inflation-adjustment norms were 
also reflected in the advance of wage increases on a strictly individual basis. In 1994, 
the Federal Office for Statistics distinguished for the first time between an individual 
and a general part of increase in collectively agreed wages (Wiesendanger Martino-
vits 1994). Wage increases accorded on an individual basis were not a new phenom-
ena in the Swiss labour market. However, new was that for the first time collectively 
agreed increases in the wage sum were not distributed on a general basis. Employers 
(and employers’ associations) thus successfully claimed their right to decide by them-
selves how to distribute a part of the collectively agreed wage increase (the individual 
share). Thereby, they considerably undermined unions’ capacity of enforcing and 
controlling a collectively agreed wage rise: If increases are granted on a strictly indi-
vidual basis, the completion of an agreement does no longer imply rights that can be 
legally obtained in the sectoral arbitration court. 
As is shown in table 4, since 1995 the proportion of the rise in wages distributed 
on a individual basis had never fallen below 27 per cent of total wage increase. In 
1997 and 1998, for 12.5 respectively 18 per cent of all covered workers, the entire 
amount of bargained wage increase was distributed on an individual basis (BFS 1997 
and 1998). A closer look at the data reveals, however, important differences between 
industrial sectors. Whereas in the secondary sector the greater part of wage adjust-
ments were general, in the service sector the individual share dominated. We will 
come back to the rationale underlying these sectoral differences in the next section. 
Tab. 4: Collectively agreed nominal wage increases, distribution between the general and individ-
ual share (Source: Wiesendanger Martinovits 1994, 1995; BFS various years). 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Inflation 0,9 1,8 0,8 0,5 0 0,8 1,6 1 … 
Total nominal wa-
ge increase 
2,3 1,4 …* 0,3 0,5 0,3 1,4 2,9 2,5 
General nominal 
wage increase 
2,0 0,8 …* 0,1 0,1 0,2 1,0 2,1 1,3 
General share 87% 57% …* 33% 20% 67% 71% 73% 53% 
Individual nominal 
wage increase 
0,3 0,6 …* 0,2 0,4 0,1 0,4 0,8 1,2 
Individual share 13% 43% …* 67% 80% 33% 29% 27% 47% 
* No data were collected for 1996 
 
This growing differentiation of wages had marked consequences in practice: 
Over the last nine years, the increase conceded on a general basis has never been suf-
ficient to compensate for the rise in the cost-of-living with the exception of 1994, 
1998 and 2001. Thus, individualization undermined the unions’ capacity to pursue a 
solidaristic wage policy within sectors. During the recession years of the 1990s, char-
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acterized by an oversupply of low skilled workers, employers have often insisted on 
an individual share in order to reallocate part of the wage load towards the more 
skilled workers (Oesch 2001b). It is interesting to note that the economic upswing in 
1998 coincided with a slight change in the trend, overlapping with the reappearance 
of larger shares of general wage adjustments. It seems plausible that better prospects 
on the labour market induced employers’ associations to privilege general increases 
in order to contain the rise in wages on an individual basis and to slow down the rota-
tion rate of the high skilled workforce (Hasler 2000).7 Nonetheless, in no decade 
since World War II was the rise in real wages as modest as during the 1990s when 
they increased by an annual average of only 0.15 per cent as compared to 0.75 per 
cent during the 1980s, 2.1 per cent during the 1970, 3.45 per cent during the 1960s 
and 1.9 per cent during the 1950s (BFS 2002b).  
What must be highlighted in this context is the new, and seemingly paradoxical, 
situation which Swiss unions increasingly face in collective bargaining. The focus of 
wage negotiation does not lie any longer exclusively on the amount of wage increase 
(or adjustment), but has gradually shifted towards the question of how the rise in sala-
ries is distributed. An illustrative example for this shift are the bargaining rounds in 
Switzerland’s largest pharmaceutical firm Novartis, where – after decentralization of 
wage issues from the sectoral agreement to the company level – negotiations between 
the works council and management failed to come to terms for five consecutive years 
(from 1998 until 2002). The point of controversy was not the amount of the wage in-
crease but its distribution among workers: While the works councils demanded a gen-
eral rise in (or adjustment of) wages, management insisted on according increases ex-
clusively on an individual basis. The same contention prevented the social partners 
from reaching a sectoral agreement in watch-making in 1995 and 1998. Both times, 
an arbitration court had to decide on the distribution of the nominal wage increase. 
By formally approving the introduction of a substantial individual share, it set a 
precedent with extensive consequences for the unions.8 
A similar evolution to the individualization of wage setting could be observed in 
the collective regulation of working time. The introduction of annualized time 
schemes mentioned earlier brought along a declining normative density on the sec-
toral level in favour of greater company discretion. In parallel, the diversification of 
working conditions (rise in work on call, in part-time work and in work during the 
night or at weekends) contrasted with the stagnation of collectively agreed working 
                                                          
7  Yet the tendencies shown by these aggregated data during years of very low inflation should 
not be over-interpreted. 
8  In 1995, the arbitration board fixed the repartition between the individual and the general 
share by 1 per cent to 0.5 per cent; in 1998 by 0.4 per cent to 0.3 per cent. 
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hours. In all of the major export industries, unions have remained been unsuccessful 
in reducing working time since 1990 (Oesch 2001a).9  
However, we would be mistaken by drawing too uniform (and simple) a picture 
of the evolution of Swiss industrial relations during the 1990s. In particular, two fac-
tors must be emphasized: Firstly, the weakness of Switzerland’s organized labour can 
only be understood in the context of an unusually long recession accompanied by an 
unusually slack labour market. Hence, with the economic recovery kicking in after 
1997, unions regained some of the lost territory and, in particular in the low wage 
sector, achieved some substantial advances. Furthermore, unions obtained a partial 
re-regulation of the labour market as a response to the agreements between Switzer-
land and the European Union introducing free movement of labour (see below). Sec-
ondly, despite the economic crisis, the institutions of collective bargaining have been 
affected very differently across sectors. In fact, the in-depth changes in some indus-
tries contrast with the stability of the negotiations in others. In order to understand 
this curious side-by-side of institutional upheaval and continuity, we wish to develop 
in the following section an explicative model accounting for these differences be-
tween sectors. 
4.  Variations across sectors: an explicative model 
As shown in the previous section, a general tendency towards more decentraliza-
tion of collective bargaining is observable over the last decade. However, this general 
trend has been counterbalanced by the persistence of profound differences across sec-
tors. In order to understand these striking variations and the different trajectories of 
sectoral collective bargaining, two explanatory variables seem particularly relevant. 
In particular, the structural characteristics of economic sectors – referring to their 
degree of exposure to international competition and the skill requirements of these 
branches – play a central role in the preferences of employers concerning collective 
bargaining and in the negotiating power of individual and collective employees. With 
the increasing liberalization of international markets, the differences between eco-
nomic sectors seem to be exacerbated.  
In addition, the characteristics of trade unions and employers’ associations (their 
organization rate and their degree of cohesion) represent a complementary factor that 
contributes to explain in more details the evolution of collective bargaining. Yet in 
the following discussion, the focus lies on the structural elements, adding organiza-
tional elements only when necessary. By hence taking into account these structural 
and organizational dimensions, it is in our view possible to establish a typology of 
collective bargaining reconfiguration and to provide a systematic matrix of interpreta-
tion concerning the recent evolution of Swiss collective bargaining. The same struc-
                                                          
9  The collectively agreed 40 hours have remained unchanged in the chemical industry since 
1990, in watch-making since 1988, in the engineering industry since 1986 and in media print-
ing since 1980.  
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tural criteria have been used by other authors in order to identify differences in the 
potential for employment growth across sectors (Ferrera et al. 2000: 12). In this arti-
cle, however, we resort to them in order to distinguish systematic differences in the 
functioning of collective bargaining: 
The first cleavage between exposed and sheltered sectors refers to the division 
between a sheltered home market sector, where costs can be passed on to consumers, 
and export-oriented sectors, where prices are given by international competition. As 
shown by authors like Iversen, Swenson and Pontusson about the centralization of 
wage bargaining in Sweden and its breakdown in the 1980s, this cleavage can directly 
affect the preferences of employers’ associations and trade unions on collective bar-
gaining (Swenson 1991; Swenson/Pontusson 1996; Iversen 1996). Trade unions in 
exposed sectors are much more sensitive to competitiveness requirements and thus 
both more moderate and open to negotiate flexible arrangements on wages or work-
ing time with employers’ associations than trade unions in sheltered sectors. While 
employers in exposed sectors are continually forced to adjust to new innovations or to 
reduce costs in order to remain competitive and stay in the market, companies in 
more sheltered sectors can more easily resort to protectionist measures and public in-
terventions. In particular, employers’ and workers’ organizations in sheltered sectors 
are able, to a certain extent, to pass cost increases on to consumers. This option does 
not exist for employers in the exposed sectors.  
The second structural cleavage refers to the skill requirements of economic 
branches, which both affect the preferences and the negotiating power of individual 
and collective actors, be they employers or workers.10 Skills enhance the market posi-
tion of individual workers and trade unions. In other words, the better qualified the 
workforce, the more interested are employers to keep the (often firm-specific) human 
capital. Thus, the negotiation power of individual employers is weaker in skill-
intensive branches of the economy than in low skill sectors. Accordingly, individual 
employers relying on high skilled workers have an interest not to replace stable and 
peaceful collective bargaining by individual – and possibly disruptive – labour rela-
tions. On the other hand, in economic sectors with a marked low skill profile, workers 
resemble more closely a commodity that can be hired and fired with less economic 
damage than in the case of high skill sectors. As a consequence, in these sectors the 
employers’ interest in collective bargaining is only given as long as it does not collide 
with the priority objective of wage costs restraint.  
By combining these two structural cleavages, it is possible to establish a hierar-
chy of the negotiating power of workers, their market power being strongest in high 
skilled sectors partially sheltered from competitive pressure and weakest in low 
                                                          
10  It is somewhat schematic to delimit skill requirement across economic sectors, because they 
also vary within a branch or a company. However, the core workforce of each sector gener-
ally relies on similar skill profile, which give thus a good approximation for the skill require-
ments for the large majority of the labour force. 
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skilled sectors exposed to international competition. Thus, export-oriented firms rely-
ing on high skilled workers typically compete more on the quality of their products 
and services than on mere prices. However, although workers in these „strategic sec-
tors” enjoy a relatively powerful market position, they have more incentives to accept 
wage restraint than high skilled workers in sheltered sectors which can more easily 
transfer cost increases to consumers.11 For industrial relations, this signifies that pro-
nounced decentralization and even deregulation of collective bargaining is most 
likely to happen in economic sectors exposed to international competition and relying 
on low skilled workers (economic sectors generally declining in industrialized coun-
tries), whereas stable and consolidated sectoral collective bargaining is most probable 
in economic sectors partially sheltered from international competition and relying on 
highly skilled workers. 
As regards the employers’ side, these two criteria seem also to account for dif-
ferences in the preferences of collective bargaining. Export-oriented companies re-
quiring mainly low skilled workers are the most interested in the active deregulation 
of collective agreements in order to respond quickly to competitive pressure stem-
ming from low wages countries. Somewhat different is the situation for employers 
exposed to international markets but depending on highly qualified workers. In prin-
ciple, this group is interested in preserving stable industrial relations but will still ask 
for more flexibility. On the other hand, politics of change will find much less support 
in the more sheltered sectors, where employers are reluctant to decentralize collective 
bargaining in order to preserve the discipline among their individual members and to 
prevent the irruption of new foreign competitors. 
In the Swiss case, a classification of economic sectors along these structural 
lines appears to give a very good approximation of the recent evolution of sectoral 
collective bargaining. In table 5, the four sectors and their corresponding bargaining 
logic are listed. In what follows, we will discuss in more details each case of the ta-
ble. 
4.1 The four trajectories of collective bargaining: some empirical evidence 
As reliable quantitative data on sectoral collective bargaining is very difficult to 
obtain, we have collected empirical material by interviewing over twenty representa-
tives of employers’ associations and trade unions (see list in the annex). Our discus-
sion of the role of the structural elements thus heavily draws on insights gained di-
rectly from the decisive actors of collective bargaining in Switzerland. We begin our 
account of the differences in trajectories of sectoral collective bargaining over the 
1990s by looking more closely at each one of the four cases. 
                                                          
11  Iversen (1996: 408) calls the sheltered sector relying on high skilled workers „privileged sec-
tor” whereas the high skill sector exposed to international competition is named the „strategic 
sector”. 
174   André Mach, Daniel Oesch: Collective Bargaining between Decentralization and Stability 
 
Tab. 5:  Structural determinants of sectoral collective bargaining 
 Exposed sectors Sheltered sectors 
 
 
 
 
High  
skilled  
workers 
I: Strategic sectors 
Engineering, chemical industry, 
watch-making, banking  
(1) Flexibility, peaceful and stable  
industrial relations 
(2) Negotiation power of workers: +++ 
(3) Decentralization and flexibilization, 
maintenance of labour peace 
II: Privileged sectors 
Public services, construction, 
various crafts (Gewerbe) 
(1)  Solid sectoral regulations 
(2)  Negotiation power of workers: ++++ 
(3)  Maintenance of strong sectoral  
regulations 
 
 
 
 
Low  
skilled  
workers 
IV: Declining sectors 
Textiles, clothing, shoe-making, 
food-processing industry 
(1) Costs reduction as a priority 
(2) Negotiation power of workers: + 
(3) Important deregulation and  
decentralization 
III: Precarious sectors 
Hotel and catering, retail distribu-
tion, personal services (cleaning 
etc.) 
(1)  Minimal sectoral regulations 
(2)  Negotiation power of workers: ++ 
(3)  Partial deregulation 
(1) employers’ preferences;   
(2) negotiation power of workers;   
(3) expected evolution of collective bargaining. 
 
I. The strategic sectors: Although more flexibility in collective bargaining was 
introduced in these sectors as regards wages and working time, the decentralization of 
collective norms from the sectoral to the company level went along with the preserva-
tion of social partnership institutions and of „labour peace” clauses in the major col-
lective agreements. This evolution could be observed for the chemical, engineering 
and watch-making industry as well as for the banking sector (for more details, see 
Oesch 2001a and b). The employers’ associations clearly advocated for a decentrali-
zation of normative elements from the collective agreements to the company level in 
order to leave more autonomy for individual firms. However, despite these quests for 
reforms, they did not seriously question the value of collective agreements. This may 
be explained, in part, by the fact that alongside bargaining about wages and working 
time, industrial relations in these sectors include, as in the privileged sectors, the co-
administration of a series of institutions. Besides pension funds, it is in particular 
through well established vocational training systems, organized on a sectoral basis 
and generally linked to sectoral collective agreements, that employers’ associations 
and trade unions seek to co-operate in order to regulate qualifications in branches like 
engineering or watch-making. The existence of such institutions, which are part of the 
general functioning of social partnership, contribute to explaining the attachment of 
employers and trade unions in these sectors to the maintenance of sectoral collective 
bargaining. 
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Moreover, the partial decentralization in these sectors must then be seen in the 
context of trade unions remaining in a very defensive position. Weakened through 
organizational fragmentation (as in engineering industries) or the decreasing part of 
blue collar workers (as in the chemical industry), they did not have the capacity to 
trade the rise in flexibility demanded by employers against a working time reduction. 
As will be discussed more in detail below, organized labour was further handicapped 
by the fact that high skilled workers in these sectors often favoured an individual 
strategy instead of collective action through trade unions and thus undermined collec-
tive regulations at the sectoral level.  
II. The privileged sectors: During the 1990s, collective bargaining has been the 
least affected in these sectors which include the construction industry, carpentry and 
several crafts from plumbing to electricity equipment. In the construction industry, 
which represents the major example in this category, the combined strong mobiliza-
tion of workers and the preferences of employers for maintaining collective regula-
tions at the sectoral level allowed the preservation of the major elements of the col-
lective agreement, and this despite the severe impact of the recession on employment. 
Not accidentally, the construction industry represents one of the sectors where collec-
tively agreed wage increases on an individual basis were least common and where 
working time has been reduced most between 1990 and 2000 (by 80 minutes, BFS 
2002c). 
Yet the rather high unionization rate and skill levels of workers explain only 
partially why employers in this sector have not followed the decentralization strategy 
of firms in other sectors. Being active in markets that are to some extent sheltered 
from international competition, collective agreements in these sectors serve employ-
ers to set minimal standards regarding working conditions and thus to regulate and 
limit competition among member firms (Walser 1999). It is then significant that all 
collective agreements with an extension of their compulsory character to the entire 
sector are situated in the sheltered sector,12 the most important being the agreements 
of the construction industry, of the hotel and catering sector and of several crafts 
(Gewerbe), mainly producing for the domestic market (Conti 2001). 
Another telling example of employers’ attachment to collective agreements in 
the privileged sectors was the adoption in 2000 of the „companion measures”, sup-
plementing the bilateral treaty with the European Union on the free movement of per-
sons.13 Designed to prevent the risk of wage dumping through massive immigration, 
the measures were highly contestet. While industrialists from export-oriented sectors 
                                                          
12  Out of a total of 1.2 millions workers covered by a collective agreement, about one fifth are 
under a collective agreement with an extension of their compulsory character (Conti 2001). 
13  Three measures were adopted: the possibility to introduce minimal wages in case of wage 
dumping, the introduction of a facilitated extension of the compulsory character of collective 
agreements and the new law on posted workers, similar to the European directive on this is-
sue. 
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employing low-skilled workers (as the textile industry, see Schmid 1999) lobbied 
against substantial companion measures, business representatives from sheltered sec-
tors were prone to compromise with the trade unions or even, as was the case in the 
construction industry, to actively favour the regulation of working conditions through 
these measures. In the end, the coalition between trade unions and employers of the 
sheltered sectors was of central importance for the adoption of the companion meas-
ures (Fischer, forthcoming). Similar coalitions had already played a central role for 
the adoption of modest countercyclical government spending programs during the re-
cession of the 1990s. 
In the public sector, despite the recent abrogation of the civil servant statute in 
the central administration and various reorganizations in postal services, the telecom 
and railway sectors, the newly negotiated collective agreements are both more de-
tailed and solid than in the private sector (see the agreements of the denationalized 
telecom company Swisscom or, above all, of the still public railway company SBB). 
However, it must be noted that, during the recession of the 1990s marked by impor-
tant public budget deficits, wage increases in the public sector have - despite a higher 
organization rate - been somewhat below the national average of the private sector 
and, in particular, quite lower than in the strategic sectors (OFS 2002b).14 
III. The precarious sectors: In these economic sectors, which are most often ser-
vice activities, the mobilization capacity of workers has been particularly weak and 
the organization rate of trade unions remains very low. Presenting overall a quite low 
skill profile, wage levels in these sheltered sectors are below national average and 
workers neither benefit from a favourable market position nor from strong negotia-
tion power. As a consequence, in some sectors like retail trading, only the biggest 
companies engage in collective bargaining, whereas the sector’s employer organiza-
tion is reluctant to conclude collective agreements and has actually refrained to do so, 
so far.  
Many employers in these sectors are nonetheless interested in maintaining 
minimal collective regulations at the sectoral level. Thus, in the hotel and catering 
sector, which has the largest Swiss collective agreement in terms of individuals cov-
ered, the employers were not interested in the suppression of the collective agree-
ment. After the major trade union of the sector had denounced the agreement in 1996 
in protest against its non-respect by some employers, there was a situation without 
                                                          
14  This seems to be quite different from Swedish wage bargaining. As shown by Garrett and 
Way (1995 and 2000), changes in the sectoral composition of trade unions, especially the 
strengthening of trade unions of the „privileged sectors” (the public sector unions mainly) and 
wages increases in the sheltered public sectors had a negative impact on macroeconomic per-
formance by raising inflation and public deficits. The changing composition of trade unions 
and the increasing competitive pressures have exacerbated the cleavage between exposed and 
sheltered sectors unions, which partially explains the breakdown of centralized wage bargain-
ing in Sweden. In the Swiss case, with much more decentralized wage bargaining, no similar 
trends could be observed and public sector unions are much weaker than in Sweden. 
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any binding contract for over a year. Interestingly, the employers’ associations de-
cided to sign a new collective agreement which continued to feature collective norms 
about wages and working time on the sectoral level. This is revelatory as in this sec-
tor, the employers’ attachment to the collective agreement is due as much to the con-
cern about minimal regulations against a ruinous competition as to the (very limited) 
mobilization of unions. The regulatory aspect is further illustrated by the fact that the 
collective agreement of the hotel and catering sector is commonly extended to all 
firms active in the branch, rendering more difficult the irruption of foreign competi-
tors hoping to exploit wage-cost advantages.  
IV. The declining sectors: In these sectors, which are well represented by the 
textile industry, the role of collective bargaining has been most openly called into 
question during the last decade. Wage levels are lower than in the generally better 
qualified industries belonging to the strategic sectors, trade unions are both weaker 
and the individual market power of workers is lower than in high skilled sectors. It 
thus comes as no surprise that both the collective agreements in the clothing and in 
the textile industry are signed by only a minority of the sectors’ firms.15 Unlike for 
employers in the precarious sectors, the competition-regulatory function of collective 
agreements is of little interest for companies active in the heavily export-oriented de-
clining sectors. In order to remain competitive in increasingly crowded international 
markets, cost reduction has been the major priority for employers at the beginning of 
the 1990s. The development of a quite aggressive strategy to reduce the function of 
collective agreements was part of this logic in the Swiss textile industry (Schaad 
1997). Thus, after the departure of several important companies from the employers’ 
association, the sectoral collective agreement was replaced by a „framework agree-
ment” (Rahmenvertrag) which is much less constraining for individual companies. 
4.2 Combining the structural elements with organizational differences 
As a broad matrix, the two structural dimensions shown in table 5 predict rather 
well the sectoral differences in employers’ preferences on the one hand and negotiat-
ing power of individual and collective wages earners on the other. Thus, they appear 
to account quite wellfor the evolution of collective bargaining in Switzerland over the 
last ten years. However, a more detailed analysis of the characteristics of the organi-
zation of collective actors and the institutions of sectoral collective bargaining would 
of course complete the general picture sketched above and provide a more precise 
analysis of the recent changes. The organization rate, the mobilization capacity, the 
strategies chosen by employers’ associations and trade unions or the way collective 
bargaining has been institutionalized during the 1930s or after World War II inter-
vene as complementary variables explaining the predominance of change or stability 
                                                          
15  A telling example in the textile industry is the fact that the newly elected president of the ma-
jor Swiss business association, EconomieSuisse, is owner of a textile company that is not cov-
ered by the sectoral collective agreement. 
178   André Mach, Daniel Oesch: Collective Bargaining between Decentralization and Stability 
 
in Swiss industrial relations. Thus, economic sectors with a similar economic profile 
(exposure to international competition and skills requirements) may follow different 
trajectories of collective bargaining because of the specific characteristics of collec-
tive actors and the path dependent effects of „social partnership” institutions. 
As a particularly telling example, the different trajectories in collective bargain-
ing in the watch-making, engineering or chemical industries could be mentioned. Al-
though not having very dissimilar economic profiles, all three industries belonging to 
the „strategic sectors”, decentralization trends have been much less important in 
watch-making than in the engineering or, above all, in the chemical industry. This is 
mainly explained by the political moderation of the employers’ federation in watch-
making, by the stronger position of the trade union and – of particular interest – by 
the absence of an employees association competing with the trade union for members 
and for influence.16 This monopoly of the workers’ union contrasts with the situation 
in the engineering or chemical industry where an increasing proportion of white col-
lar employees is, to a large extent, organized in rival employees’ associations. During 
the 1990s, these associations were quite in favour of flexible working time schemes 
and – to a lesser extent – of individual wage arrangements and at the same time did 
not support any uniform reduction in working time. Thus, not only in terms of mem-
bership, the employees’ associations in the engineering and chemical industries, the 
VSAM17 and the VSAC18, have become serious rivals of the traditional unions be-
longing to the SGB (for more details, see Mach, forthcoming). In these sectors, cross-
class coalitions between high skilled employees and employers’ associations had a 
major influence in shifting industrial relations towards more flexible and decentral-
ized institutional settings. 
5.  Conclusions 
Crouch and Traxler (1995) have synthesized the recent evolution of collective 
bargaining in Europe by identifying three major trends: decentralization, through a 
shift from multi-employer bargaining to single employer bargaining, deregulation by 
suppressing rules codified in legislation or collective agreements and disorganization 
through the weakening of the organizing capacities of employers’ associations and 
trade unions. „As a consequence, ‘productivity coalitions’ within the enterprise are 
supposed to replace macro- and meso-corporatist arrangements as business' preferred 
form of co-operation with labour” (Crouch/Traxler 1995: 3).  
As we have shown in the first half of this article, quite similar tendencies could 
also be observed for the recent period in Switzerland. This is somewhat astonishing 
                                                          
16  In the watch-making industry, the SMUV, as the traditional trade union, largely maintained 
its monopoly situation in the representation of workers and displays a higher organization rate 
and mobilization capacity than in the engineering or in the chemical sector. 
17  Verband Schweizerischer Angestelltenvereine der Maschinenindustrie 
18  Verband Schweizerischer Angestelltenvereine der Chemischen Industrie 
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as Swiss industrial relations were already largely decentralized at the beginning of the 
1990s, only around 50 per cent of employees in the private sector being covered by a 
collective agreement. Nonetheless, wage bargaining as well as working time ar-
rangements have increasingly been transferred from the sectoral to the company level 
in several important economic sectors. Moreover, a series of norms concerning wage 
adjustments were either eliminated from sectoral agreements or delegated to the level 
of individual companies and works councils. In a context of economic stagnation and 
strongly declining membership, trade unions were incapable of resisting the employ-
ers’ offensive of the last decade. However, this evolution did not signify the disap-
pearance of sectoral collective bargaining, but its reconfiguration in a more decen-
tralized institutional framework with modified negotiation rules and sectoral collec-
tive agreements that contained less constraining norms for individual companies, but 
which continued to feature „social peace clauses”.  
In addition, as we have argued in the second half of this article, the diagnosis of 
a general trend towards more decentralization ignores the persistence of strong sec-
toral differences in collective bargaining, differences that have even accentuated over 
the last decade. We have proposed a model that explains the maintenance of sectoral 
logics in collective bargaining with the variation in both the preferences of employers 
and the negotiation power of wage earners, two dimensions that vary across eco-
nomic sectors, depending on the degree of exposure to international competition and 
skill requirements. For the recent evolution of collective bargaining in Switzerland, 
this interpretation seems particularly relevant and appears to be supported quite well 
by empirical evidence.  
Finally, even if the last decade was particularly negative for the trade unions and 
their members (stagnation of real wages, decentralization of wage bargaining, sharp 
decline in membership), since the economic recovery in 1998, organized labour could 
celebrate two important successes which might – at least partially – counterbalance 
the decentralization trend and the potential threat of increasing wage differentials that 
goes along with this trend. The two advances refer firstly to a highly successful na-
tional campaign against low wages launched in 1998 by the largest union federation, 
the SGB, and secondly to the adoption of „companion measures” to the bilateral 
agreement with the EU on the free-movement of persons (Rieger 2001). In the first 
case, the SGB decided in its 1998 congress to launch a national campaign against low 
wages which led to a mobilization in several low-wage sectors and found a large echo 
in the media. In several collective agreements, especially in the „precarious” and the 
„declining” sectors, minimum wages were introduced or substantially raised as a re-
sult of the campaign’s pressure. As a result, minimum wages in collective agreements 
for low-skilled workers increased by 7 per cent between 1999 and 2001 as compared 
to a mere 3 per cent growth in collectively agreed wages of skilled workers (BFS 
2002b). In the second case, the trade unions were, in alliance with employers’ repre-
sentatives of the more sheltered sectors (especially from the construction industry), 
the decisive actors in pushing for substantial „companion measures” which were to 
accompany the bilateral agreements with the EU in 2000. Their implementation is 
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likely to strengthen collective bargaining in low-skill sectors and to bring about some 
re-regulation in those economic sectors which have been particularly destabilized 
during the 1990s.  
In conclusion, as these advances partially offset the general trend of the 1990s, 
they remind us that the upheaval in Swiss industrial relations took place in a particu-
larly harsh economic context of six continuous years of stagnation. It is thus too early 
to know whether unions will succeed in partially reversing the depicted changes to-
wards more decentralized and less regulated collective bargaining in a context of 
tighter labour markets and economic expansion. 
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